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Synthesis Report on SuRI Workshop on Cyber Risk & Information Security held on June 2-4, 2014 
IMPROVING CYBER AND INFORMATION SECURITY  
 
Anjali Nursimulu, IRGC 
Cyber technology is becoming increasingly pervasive, 
driven in part by the increase in low-end embedded 
technologies, for example, in household appliances and 
devices in order to provide new functionalities. The 
average number of IP-based devices in personal use 
was 0.1, 4 and 140 in 2007, 2010 and 2013, 
respectively. This growth enables higher interconnectivity, 
supporting the emergence of 
such trends as Big Data and 
the internet-of-everything. 
Together with the increase in 
malice and asset lifecycle 
mismatch, the potential for mounting privacy and security 
risks is becoming evident.  
Developing a fix to the problem is difficult. Academic 
research does not always translate into practical 
strategies or policies. In the absence of liability, Industry 
does not find business value in addressing the emerging 
risks. And, intelligence agencies focus on national 
threats and surveillance. The need for policies and 
guidelines to address shortcomings in privacy and 
security strategies in view of such practices as bolted-
on security and the rise of malice is unequivocal.   
 
THE CHALLENGE OF ADDRESSING TARGETED 
VERSUS BENIGN FAILURES
1
 
Targeted cyber-attack is the 
new challenge in IT security. 
Marketability of information — 
for targeted advertising, 
insurance, banking and even 
financial trading as in 
Bloomberg sentiment analysis tool — is fuelling the 
growth of espionage and the concurrent growth of an 
enabling black market.  
Malice is dynamic, adaptive and reactive to changes in 
practitioner’s product and defense strategies. The 
practitioner therefore needs to be proactive and not 
reactive. Probabilistic risk assessment, while relevant for 
random failures, is not sufficient or simply does not 
work in malicious environment. Traditional probabilistic 
threat models fail to address the systemic and persistent 
nature of targeted malice. Trojan, FLAME, DUQU, 
STUXNET attacks for instance are hard to detect and 
may require frequent resets. But how often and at what 
cost? How to do so in complex distributed networks? 
The business community has yet to realize how much 
change to operational environment and in design is 
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needed in face of malice. Current 
engineering practices are 
maladaptive and misaligned in that 
what works well in benign-failure 
environments is flawed in malice 
environments. Moreover, security 
is pushed aside because of cost and lack of skills; so 
risks are passed on to end users. Insufficient emphasis 
is put on mutual suspicion and other security primitives. 
Taken together, badly used security models, poorly 
understood and little analyzed threats constitute the 
perfect recipe for disaster.  
Driven by quick paths to profits 
rather than the desire to build a 
quality system, the fast pace of 
contemporary technological 
changes are leading to a complex 
and vulnerable cyber and cyber-physical architectures. 
Design focuses on ease of use and added functionality 
rather than security, potentiating technical debt. Technical 
debt can be due to conceptual errors in the design of a 
product; this is best solved early on during design 
phase. There are also implementation errors in the 
product as built and discovered in deployed products. 
Thus, even robust products may entail a transfer of 
debt from vendor to client and consumers. The risk is 
that such technical debt can suddenly burst. 
Relatedly, there is a cyber-trust 
bubble which may originate from 
a mismatch between human and 
cyber trust, and associated 
cognitive dissonance. Human 
trust depends on identity, role, capabilities and intent; it 
is limited, does not scale readily, is easily revoked and 
once revoked, it is not easily recovered. Cyber trust on 
the other hand depends on identity and usually not 
much else. It is transitive—it spreads easily and widely—
and is hard to revoke. Cyber trust (and certificates) is 
poorly understood; and risks are created when people 
are led astray.  
Cyber risks are thus real 
and need to be studied 
with further scrutiny. 
Analysis is required on how 
fast an event can escalate 
and with what 
consequences. Attackers will be always ahead of the 
game with attacks lined-up. Our society will be 
vulnerable to cyber failures owing to its complexity. Not 
all solutions are technical. Threat and security analysis 
needs to innovate on all three fronts — physical, cyber 
and human — as they interact.  
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PROMOTING SECURITY-BY-DESIGN AND 
ASSURANCE
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The rapid deployment of network-capable appliances in 
home and office environments raises concerns over the 
fact that many of these embedded systems have been 
designed with very simple, if any, threat profile in mind. 
How trustworthy are they? Conventional antivirus and 
antimalware will not provide the necessary security.  
How trustworthy do they need to be? There is social 
stigma. End-users rarely care if at all they are well-
informed about the risks.  
       It is therefore problematic that 
emerging consumer-level 
products typically do not have 
security designed in. 
Designing with security in mind as a major requirement 
only happens in a small number of cases, typically 
driven by demand for certification or where there are 
clear liability issues. Low-end embedded devices, such 
as smart-cards, sensors, RFID, smartphones, 
peripherals, household devices and many industrial 
systems, are typically low-cost, low-powered devices 
with limited facilities and limited memory and may not 
be capacitated even for secure remote attestation.  
Therefore, while scientists are delving into such 
questions as the smallest number of architectural 
features that are needed to achieve provably secure 
remote attestation or the lowest number of additional 
gates and minimal modifications to connect platforms, 
forward-looking policy should consider alternative, 
sustainable solutions.   
But, can policy facilitate the large-scale adoption of 
security-by-design? How should the development and 
associated assurance costs be funded?   How to 
address the security challenges of software-based legacy 
devices that cannot be retrofitted? The following section 
provides some insights from medical device 
cybersecurity.  
 
BOOSTING CYBERSECURITY OF MEDICAL DEVICES
3
  
There is a (flawed) belief 
that everything is made 
much safer because of 
internet. The tightening of 
medical-device standards by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
4
 reflects the 
belief that implantable medical devices should be 
trustworthy and that improved security will enable 
medical device innovation. In particular, wireless devices 
are believed to increase safety by enabling remote 
monitoring and fine-tuning. But, where does the security 
bar in the cyber-pervaded and safety-centric medical 
world really lie? And, what are the real risks? 
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device-makers-to-boost-cybersecurity 
The main risk is not about hackers 
breaking into medical devices. The 
money is not there. The two main 
risks are wide-scale unavailability of 
patient care and integrity of medical 
sensors. There is already evidence 
that Health Information Technology 
(HIT) devices can be globally rendered unavoidable. In 
such cases as in the cases where old software in 
legacy infrastructures is no longer supported, users are 
helpless. Manufacturers using wireless, radio, USP port, 
networking and cloud can no longer claim unawareness 
of security risks and recognize that 
software updates should be issued 
to customers. But how often and at 
what cost? A related major concern 
in the field of medicine the 
mismatch between software and 
hardware lifecycles, in particular the 
pervasiveness of legacy and ageing infrastructure, which 
altogether increase the cost of patching and related 
risks.  
There are also management issues 
due to diffusion of responsibilities. 
Software updates involve agency 
risks such as implementation errors 
or cumulative effect of unsafe 
practices such as ignoring update 
notifications. Furthermore, there is little privacy or 
security in take-home devices There is also the 
question of how significant are intentional, malicious 
malfunctions in software. Factory installed malware is 
quite common, even if unintentional and accidental. Is 
there too much software in medical devices? Is there 
overconfidence in software? What about flaws in design 
of user-interfaces that induce human error? 
From a compliance perspective, it 
may be relevant to ask engineers 
what design controls are in place to 
address cybersecurity risks. But 
engineers may be protected by 
limited liability as risks in medical 
sector are largely due to system level effects and 
vulnerabilities inherent in the widespread practice of 
downstream integration of broadly-sourced devices. 
Security is costly, especially in the absence of liability. 
Can we rely on trust mechanism for security? If not, 
there is a need for regulatory policy. 
There is a need for premarket evaluation of security and 
privacy elements of devices and systems and design of 
post-market systems that enable effective collection of 
cybersecurity threat indicators for medical devices. But 
do medical device manufacturers understand threat 
models whether failures or sabotage? The challenge is 
that IT people who are responsible for security do not 
have the requisite safety background and typically 
compete for airtime. There are new emerging risks with 
medical devices in the cloud and authentication may not 
always provide privacy and security protection.  
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IS USABLE SECURITY A UTOPIA?
5
  
Auguste Kerkhoff stated almost 130 years ago that the 
security of a cryptosystem should depend solely on the 
secrecy of the key, meaning that one should be able to 
reveal the entire secret of a system to the enemy 
without causing inconvenience. Importantly the key 
should be easy to remember and communicate without 
having to be written down.   
But today, there is significant 
authentication fatigue, driven by such 
factors as large the number of 
required resets and complexity of 
keys. At the workplace, the 
management of passwords has been 
documented to increase the workload 
to the user and typically leads to 
shortcuts.  
These beg the question as to whether it is possible to 
forget passwords and devise new authentication 
schemes, focusing on economics — reducing friction, 
time and workload — instead of user interface. The 
underlying reasoning is that the problem is deeper than 
the user interface and instead lies on the incentives and 
authentication mechanism and the compliance threshold.  
As a result, there may be a need for policy, whether 
internal or externally instituted, to promote security 
hygiene. This can be facilitated by a security budget to 
foster prioritization on where authentication is genuinely 
required and transform existing authentication deployment. 
 
EGRESS ACCOUNTABILITY AS A SOLUTION TO 
EMERGING PRIVACY CONCERNS?  
Massive, systematic loss of privacy is 
a serious risk. With the growth of 
algorithmic decision-making, there is 
scope for vast automated abuse of 
data that are made available for 
instance through the digitization of 
medical records, public posting of 
genomes, mobile-device tracking and digital finger-
printing. In such a hypothetical post-privacy world, it will 
be impossible to control the information flow.  
Privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) such as 
anonymizers have been poised to provide privacy 
protection but even TOR anonymity technology has been 
overridden. Current PET also ignores the background of 
private data. Egress accountability (EA) is being 
proposed as an alternative solution. EA is a very 
general approach — provable without revelation of the 
algorithm — that ensures that the output of an algorithm 
is based only on inputs that are considered to be fair.   
But in a post-privacy world where privacy is not 
prevalent, is “certifiable” use of fair-only information a 
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plausible cure? If it is, what regulatory and institutional 
mechanism will support its deployment? Is it conceivable 
that the cure is worse than the disease? 
 
CONCLUSIONS: ON THE NEED FOR POLICY 
The threat-o-meter is shifting from unsafe practices and 
accidents to sabotage; cybersecurity risks are now 
considered foreseeable risks. Security cannot be bolted 
on; it has to be built in. Design controls in early 
manufacturing should address risks. Will market lead to 
more security or do we need regulation?  
Owing to limited liability, most manufacturers have little 
incentive to bear the upfront developmental cost of 
security-by-design and associated assurance cost or to 
cooperate on standards, e.g., for interoperability. 
Depending on firm size, resource constraints may be 
binding. Likewise, there 
are lots of variations in 
CTOs’ skills and/or their 
ability to exercise their 
capabilities. Left to 
evolutionary market 
forces, security outcomes 
will not change before 
years even in the presence of net-benefits. Security, as 
part of the solution, promotes safety, effectiveness, cost 
reduction, assurance, end-user acceptance, predictability, 
reliability dependability and, in networks, interoperability.  
 
SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Promote security-by-design:  
§ Security risk process should 
parallel safety risk and begin at 
concept phase.  
§ Promote and systematize rigorous assurance: 
installed malware and other implementation errors 
are not uncommon.  
§ Promote industry know-how on threat models for 
complex and engineered cyber risks. 
Promote security hygiene and compliance 
§ Less is more: only cyber elements that have 
meaningful use should be embedded in our devices; 
likewise only relevant and fair information should be 
used. Authentication should be used with parsimony. 
§ Provide a platform for sharing of threat indicators.  
§ Pre-market review and cybersecurity updates of 
COTS software should be systematized.  
Incentivize innovative cyber security beyond compliance: 
§ Probabilistic testing and reputation risk: What is 
brought to market should fulfill security engineering 
expectation; the thinking and threat model should be 
documented in place of check list approaches and 
manufacturers warned of the forensic scrutiny in 
case of recall.   
§ Promote research on and experimentation with novel 
authentication and privacy-preserving methods. 
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Report on panel discussion held on June 2, 2014 at EPFL on 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF AUTONOMOUS CARS 
 
Anjali Nursimulu, IRGC 
 
LOGICAL INCREMENTALISM. 
Opening the session, Arnaud 
de la Fortelle, Director of the 
Robotics Lab at Mines 
ParisTech, highlighted that 
the idea of autonomous cars 
is not new. The concepts of 
automated road, automated 
trains and unmanned trams have been around for 
several decades already. And, automated speed control, 
lane keeping and longitudinal distance automate control 
facilities are common-place. In this light, the introduction 
of autonomous cars is consistent with an evolutionary 
trend in passenger mobility, and not vulnerable to 
attacks from the cyberspace as long as such cars are 
intelligent but not cooperative. The Google car is one 
such prototype. But the risk of physical cyber attacks or 
near-field attacks cannot be eliminated. This said, more 
research needs to be undertaken for fully automated 
systems. 
GIANT EVOLUTIONARY LEAP. 
John Scott, Chief Risk Officer 
at Zurich Insurance, remarked 
that it takes time for cars to 
change, thus echoing Arnaud ’ s 
idea of incrementalism. 
However, he quickly added that 
autonomous cars provide a 
tremendous opportunity for 
designing entirely new mobility concepts in new cities, 
where the requisite infrastructure for fully networked 
road-systems, encompassing cooperative vehicles, can 
be built into the architecture. This is essentially because 
of the possibility to start from scratch. Masdar City 
project in Abu Dhabi is one such example. The drastic 
change requires not only technological advances but also 
changes in business models from product to service 
provision and societal change from an ownership 
economy to a sharing economy. But, in general, the 
safety — encompassing built-in fail-safe mechanism for 
risks from carry-in device connectivity—and economics of 
autonomous cars are believed to drive public acceptance 
over the tipping point.  
STANDARDS AND INTEROPERABILITY. Speaking to 
the topic of rules of telecommunications for business, 
Sylvain Glatz, Specialist in Universal Service, Network 
Neutrality and Quality of 
Services and Internet of 
Things at OFCOM/BAKOM, 
mentioned five points that will 
be need to be addressed from 
a regulatory perspective. First, 
do hardwares embedded in 
autonomous cars conform to 
radio-frequency emission standards? Second, should 
cars have IP addresses? Third, what should be the 
obligations of new service providers? Fourth, how to 
design adapted emergency call assistance for 
autonomous vehicles? Fifth, what will be the golden 
rules for standards to ensure interoperability without 
sacrificing security and who will be responsible for 
writing them? 
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X	
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW PLAYERS. 
Victor Schlegel, Head of 
Business Intelligence and 
BigData Services at Swisscom 
AG, discussed the opportunities 
associated with automated cars 
and automated road traffic for 
placing new services related to big data on Swiss 
Market. He substantiated Swisscom’s strategy of tapping 
into new growth areas by presenting models Swisscom 
has developed to predict traffic flows on motorways 
based on anonymized mobile use data.  
The ensuing discussion was lively and varied. Jean-
Pierre Hubaux remarked that with the exception of 
Spotify and Skype, most IT innova t ion comes f rom 
US. Wi l l Europe be a laggard in the age of 
In te rne t-o f-
Th ings? In 
reality, Volvo 
has a fleet of 
100 driverless 
cars — larger 
than Google 
Cars. Mercedes, Audi, Volkswagen and BMW have most 
of the components of driverless cars. One could 
speculate that these large players are more cautious in 
revealing their strategies and development compared to 
Google, for which the Google Car is a mere positioning 
strategy. But, as with all new technologies there will be 
winners and losers. Traditional selling points such as “
driving experience” will be displaced. The value chain of 
passenger will expand as new players such as 
Swisscom, Google and IBM position themselves to 
provide mobility services for intelligent vehicles.  
INTERMITTENT COEXISTENCE AND TRAFFIC RULES. 
Speaking on behalf of the industry partners, collaborating 
with the EPFL Transportation Center, Michaël Thémans 
discussed two research streams, namely the design of 
affordable autonomous cars for mass deployment and 
the investigation of traffic rules for cooperative road 
traffic in view of planned automation of traffic network 
for 2030. This research can also inform rules to 
facilitate the unavoidable and intermittent co-existence of 
driven and driverless cars.  The research also involves 
in foresight about future traffic flows on highways, 
roundabouts and junctions. In mixed traffic, are 
driverless and driven cars friend or foe? How will 
drivers react to a driverless counterpart on the street?  
RISK AND COMPLEXITY. Prof. James Larus, Dean at 
EPFL ’ s School of Computer and Communications 
Science raised concern over the apparent trend towards 
cooperative and 
intelligent transportation 
systems. These will 
involve an increasing 
number of connections 
and (near) real-time 
feedbacks among 
vehicles and critical infrastructures. The resultant 
increase in complexity imply a potential for escalation of 
risks, whether from random failures that cascade through 
the network or from cyber sabotage. The fully automated 
network architecture will not only be harder to secure 
but also costlier.  
INSURANCE AND LIABILITY.  Autonomous cars are 
purported to be safer, reducing the number of accidents 
and casualties. The 
risk is reduced—which 
translates into savings 
on insurance policy, 
but who bears the 
liability in the event of an accident?  The current 
Vienna convention stipulates that the driver has 
responsility of the car and therefore bears the liability. 
But does such responsibility hold in the Google Car 
where there is no possibility of manual override of the 
automatic system. Who is liable? Is it the car 
manufacturer? Is it the software designer? What if  the 
autonomous car is endowed with a learning algorithm 
that results in emergent behavior? Are new liability laws 
needed?  Is mutual fund insurance the way forward?  
SOME PENDING QUESTIONS 
1. What will be the 
residual risks (hazard, 
vulneratbilities, exposures and 
threats) in a world with fully 
cooperative road traffic?  
2. What mechanisms will 
need to be put in place to 
mitigate the impact of such risks in the event of 
risk-materialisation? 
3. What business and insurance models will support 
the foreseen cooperative traffic? 
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